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Abstract  
This article aims to examine IRAs in Turkey in terms of structural and functional 
situation, place of in Turkish administrative structure and control and to evaluate their 
formal independence levels. However, before doing that we will briefly explain reasons 
of creating IRAs and the concept of independence of IRAs because of their importance to 
evaluate IRAs and their formal independence levels in Turkey.         
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Introduction 
Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) have a long history in Anglo-Saxon 
administrative tradition. United States is known as the first country to establish an 
organization which can be defined as an IRAs and a starting point for a western type 
institution (Majone 1996: 16; Moran 2003: 13; Goodman and Wrightson 1987: 11; Fisher 
1998: 146). However, IRAs show features and forms changing from one country to 
another both in theory and practice (Bouckert and Peters 2004: 22). 
IRAs have become widespread gradually as a result of market economy being adopted 
and privatization policies taking place. It is observed that the creation of IRAs is 
synchronous with statist policies being replaced by regulated market economy. In this 
context, it is noted that, as a result of privatization and liberalism trends, regulation 
policies took the place of ‘positive state’ and that they have been effective in the rise of 
‘regulatory state’ (Majone 1994, 1997) or ‘regulatory capitalism’ (Levi-Faur 2005; Levi-
Faur and Jordana 2005). 
IRAs are seen as a reflection of the changing role of the state in economic and social 
areas to public administration and affect the economic, social, political and administrative 
areas more and more. However, in countries which have little experience in delegating 
functions to ‘arm’s length’ institutions, IRAs are a controversial topic. Turkey is one of 
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these countries. Turkey is a unitary state and these agencies are in conflict with the main 
principles of the unitary state structure as a result of their unique characteristics. 
In this context, this article aims to examine IRAs in Turkey in terms of structural and 
functional situation, place of in Turkish administrative structure and control and to 
evaluate their formal independence levels. However, before doing that we will briefly 
explain reasons of creating IRAs and the concept of independence of IRAs because of 
their importance to evaluate IRAs and their formal independence levels in Turkey.         
 
1. Creating IRAs and Reasons Of Delegation Powers to IRAs 
 
The main rationale behind the creation of IRAs is to improve the efficiency of markets. In 
order to do necessary arrangements for establishing a competitive market structure and to 
implement sanctions to actors which do not comply with rules; it is essential that capacity 
of state be developed in accordance with run of law based on governance model (World 
Bank 1997: 4). Likewise, IRAs are seen as an important element of governance structure, 
that is ‘regulatory state’, which state will form in order to undertake regulation, inspection 
and supervision functions (Thatcher 2002b: 859-860; Scott 2000: 45; Das et al. 2002: 1; 
Thatcher 2005: 347). 
The primary aim of such agencies is the need and purpose to purify areas of the 
communication, energy, economic competition, telecommunication, banking and finance 
from the influence and pressure of politicians and actors that are active in these sectors 
(Cushman 1953: 145; Jacobzone 2005: 72). Independent regulatory agencies, in the 
context of depoliticized state, are seen as the guaranty for objective and unbiased 
administration of these sensitive sectors. 
Moreover, there are many reasons that can be given for creating IRAs and delegating 
power to them in the literature. These reasons are summarized as below (Gilardi 2005a: 
102-103) 
Expertise: IRAs are closer to the regulated sector than ordinary bureaucracy and can more 
easily gather relevant information. In addition, IRAs can easily adapt to technology or 
technical knowledge. 
Flexibility: IRAs’ autonomy makes them more able to flexibly adjust regulations to 
changing conditions. 
Credible Commitments: IRAs are insulated from political influence and electoral 
constraints. Thus, IRAs can increase the credibility of the pro-market and fair-regulation 
commitments of governments. 
Stability: IRAs provide a stable and predictable regulatory environment. Stability means 
that rules will not be subject to sudden and unexpected change. 
Efficacy and Efficiency: As a result of previous factor, IRAs lead to better regulatory 
outputs. 
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Public Participation and Transparency: The decision making process of IRAs is more 
open and transparent than that of ministerial departments and is thus more sensitive to 
diffused interests such as those of consumers. 
Decision Making Costs: Delegation to IRAs reduces decision making cost. 
Blame Shifting: IRAs enable politicians to avoid blame, when regulatory failures occur or 
when unpopular decisions are taken. 
Political Uncertainty: When politicians set up a policy, they know that this may in future 
be charged of a different part or coalition wins the elections. To prevent this, policy may 
be insulated from politics. IRAs are a means for politicians to fix policies so that they will 
last beyond their term of office.     
However, the functional advantages such as adaptation to technology or technical 
knowledge and expertise that these agencies have are not sufficient on in explaining the 
delegation to these agencies and to analyze them. Differences in the spread of IRAs and 
the timing of their creation, the variations in institutional forms chosen in their 
establishment can not be explained by the functional advantages. At this point, Thatcher 
adds some ‘contextual factors’ to the analysis. These contextual factors are policy 
learning and institutional isomorphism; state traditions and structures, political leadership 
and state reforms. In addition, direct support from international organizations such as 
IMF, OECD and WB and tendency of Europeanization place important role in creating 
IRAs (Gilardi 2005b: 84-85).   
Moreover, it is stated that New Public Management (NPM) is a important approach in 
creating IRAs. Because, the concept of ‘agencification’ or ‘distributed governance’ is a 
core element of NPM (Moynihan 2006; Verhoest et al. 2004) and agencification and 
distributed governance refers to the great number of non-majoritian institutions and quasi-
autonomous non-governmental organizations (Flinders 2004)    
 
2. Independence of IRAs 
 
Independence of IRAs is generally defined as the ability of these institutions to make 
decisions regarding the sectors they regulate without any affect or intervention from 
outside, especially from government or the actors in the regulated sector (Smith 1997a: 9; 
Virag 1999: 16; Hogwood 1990: 595). To put in another way, independence means that 
the classical administrative supervisory authority of political power and administrative 
units is not implemented over organs and functions of these agencies and that other 
organs can not order or instruct to these agencies. Actually, independence, in this context, 
describes the stand of such agencies against the actors around them. 
Independence of IRAs can be assessed under two dimensions, organic and functional 
independencies. By organic independence, it is meant that those who are appointed to 
management boards have more security compared civil servants in other institutions in 
the context of appointment methods, terms of office and their dismissal procedure. IRAs 
 
 
26
which have high independence level are characterized by a long term of office for their 
board members, appointment board members based on technical skills and dismissal only 
for official misbehaviour not related to policy (Thatcher 2001: 13; Gilardi 2001b: 9). In 
addition, to ensure organic independence of IRAs, sources of revenues and budgets of 
these agencies and their personnel policies are also important factors. Functional 
independence means that units of executive organ does not have any direct authority like 
putting operation under approval, blocking or delaying the operation coming into force 
over the operations and actions of IRAs, which may lead to invalidity of such operations 
and actions and that no institution or authority can give orders or instructions which will 
change these operations or prevent them from coming into force.    
Although there are opinions stating that formal independence is not always a necessary 
condition for an efficient regulatory system (Stern 1997: 72), others state that the 
‘independence’ of IRAs should be put under guaranty and they present some 
requirements to be fulfilled for this purpose (Smith 1997a: 11; Estache 1997: 1; Virag 
1999: 16). These requirements are as follows: 
 
- to provide IRAs with a distinct legal mandate, free of ministerial control, 
- to determine professional standards in the appointment of board members, 
- to delegate power to IRAs to regulate and guide the practice, 
- to determine board members’ terms in such a way that they will not coincide with 
general political elections, 
- to exempt IRAs from civil servant salary rules which will hinder them from 
employing personnel of high quality, 
- to provide IRAs with special budget which relies on fees levied on the regulated 
industries instead of public funds, 
- not to interfere their own personnel policies, 
- to appoint head and board members for fixed and long terms (for 6 years) and to 
protect them against arbitrary  removal from office, 
- not to give the chance of appointment renewable, 
- to design their dismissal procedure so as to protect them against dismissal based 
on political grounds.  
 
At this point, it is necessary to state that especially functional independence of IRAs 
should not be seen as an absolute independence but as a relative one. According to Fesler 
(1968: 192), absolute independence of IRAs against execution and parliament is a ‘myth’. 
As Christensen and Laegreid (2005: 17) points that it is necessary to distinguish between 
the de jure formal level of independence and de facto independence. Real agency 
independence might not correspond with formal agency independence. Politicians might 
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use informal channels to influence the decision making of agencies. Besides, IRAs should 
consider development plans, yearly programs, government programs, economy policies 
implemented in decisions they will make. Otherwise, problems and conflicts will rise 
between IRAs and governments about carrying out of policies and the relationship 
between them will take a form which can be defined as ‘bureaucrat-politician dilemma’. 
 
3. IRAs in Turkey: A Structural and Functional Analysis 
 
IRAs is one of the most debated topics in Turkey in recent years. Such debates are 
generally about features these institutions have, the duties and authority of these 
institutions, their places in administrative organization, supervision and accountability of 
them. As a result, it is early to say that Turkey is a country which is compatible with these 
institutions. 
In Turkey, there is not consensus even on the term to use for these institutions and this 
topic is the reason for intense debates (Karacan 2001: 8). Even though, these agencies are 
generally named as ‘independent regulatory agencies’, terms like ‘supervisory boards’, 
‘autonomous agencies’, ‘regulatory boards’, ‘regulators’ and ‘wise committees’ are also 
used (Ozdag 2002: 8; TUSIAD 2002: 151). 
If one looks at the creating of IRAs in Turkey, he can see that these agencies emerged not 
in framework of specific principles and doctrines but in the context of conjectural 
developments. For example, while the creating of Competition Authority (CA) is 
explained by the Customs Union process, the emergence of Banking Regulation and 
Supervision Agency (BRSA), Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA), 
Telecommunication Authority (TA) and Public Procurement Authority (PPA) is justified 
by the suggestions of IMF and European Union candidacy process (TUSIAD 2002: 75). 
Additionally, if one considers the regular reports on Turkey’s progress towards accession 
to European Union, it can be seen that expectations regarding the IRAs are stated in every 
report. Similarly, OECD notes that the reforms which make the regulatory and 
supervisory functions of state a matter of primary importance in Turkey are directed and 
supported by both national and international elements (OECD 2002). 
There are nine active IRAs in Turkey. All of them were created by laws made in the 
Turkish National Assembly (TNA). Consequently, they can not be described as 
constitutional institutions. IRAs have public legal personality in Turkey. There is the 
related Ministry of the each IRA to secure the administrative integrity according to 
Turkish Administrative Law. IRAs perform their duties and exercise their powers through 
their boards. These boards are decision-making authority of IRAs. 
However, it is not an absolute necessity for IRAs to have decision-making authority 
structured as boards. While some countries like USA, Argentina, Chile, Philippines use 
boards, others countries like United Kingdom and Malaysia entrust decision-making 
authority to a single individual (World Bank 1998: 137). There are advantages and 
disadvantages specific to both methods. While ‘individual decision-maker’ is efficient in 
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terms of speed of decision-making, accountability for decisions made, demand for 
resources and predictability of decisions; board is efficient in terms of involvement of 
multiple points of view, a sound stand against negative pressures from outside and 
individual interests, loose ties with political power and contribution to stability (Smith 
1997b: 17). However, Turkey has preferred to structure decision-making authority of 
IRAs as board. 
IRAs are determined briefly as below: 
Capital Markets Board (CMB): CMB was established by the Law 2499 which was 
enacted in 1981. CMB is the regulatory and supervisory authority in charge of the 
securities markets in Turkey. The CMB has been making detailed regulations for 
organizing the markets and developing capital market instruments and institutions for the 
past twenty-six years in Turkey. Its major objective is to take the necessary measures for 
fostering the development of capital markets and hence to contribute to the efficient 
allocation of financial resources in the country while ensuring investor protection. 
Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTSC): RTSC was established by the Law 3984 
in 1994. RTSC is responsible for the regulation of the radio and television broadcasts all 
across Turkey. RTSC was founded in place of the Radio and Television High Council and 
had broader competence and responsibilities compared to its former position.  
Competition Authority (CA): CA was established by Law 4054 in 1994. However, CA 
commenced operation in 1997. The main task of the Ca is to prevent agreements 
restricting competition, to control of mergers and acquisitions which adversely affect 
competition and to monitor of state aids. Authority also evaluates complaints from the 
parties concerned and consumers  
Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA): BRSA was established by the Law 
4389 in 1999. BRSA’s mission is to ensure confidence and stability in financial markets, 
to create an environment that will improve competitiveness of the financial system, to 
enable effective operating of loan system, to protect the rights and benefits of the 
depositors, to take necessary measures for enabling institutions subject to supervision to 
operate in a sound, secure and well-organized manner in market discipline. 
Telecommunications Authority (TA): TA was established by the Law 4502 in 2000. The 
main purpose of the TA is to ensure a complete liberalization in the sector. The 
establishment of the Authority has an importance for ensuring continuance, order, 
reliability and transparency in the telecommunication sector. In addition, TA is the first 
sector regulation institution of Turkey. 
Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA): EMRA was established by the Law 4628 
in 2001. Nowadays, the objective of the EMRA is to ensure a financially viable, stable 
and transparent energy market and to take necessary measures to provide sufficient 
electricity, natural gas, petroleum and LPG of good quality to consumers. In this context, 
EMRA has broad competence in electricity and gas sector.        
 Sugar Authority (SA): SA was established by the Law 4634. Having a public legal 
personality, the Authority have been formed in order to ensure application of Sugar Law 
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and other relevant legislation, to supervise and conclude related applications, to make 
arrangements within the framework of the powers granted by the Law, to fulfill other 
duties entrusted and exercise the powers granted by the Law. 
Tobacco, Tobacco Products and Alcoholic Beverages Market Regulation Authority 
(TTPABMRA): TTPABMRA was established by the Law 4733 in 2002. The Authority 
have been formed in order to ensure application of this Law. Its main task is to regulate 
and supervise the tobacco and alcoholic beverages market. 
Public Procurement Authority (PPA): PPA which is administratively and financially 
autonomous was established by the Law 4734 in 2002. The Authority carries out the 
duties assigned with Public Procurement Law. Its main task is to prepare regulations 
related with public procurement and to examine the complaint about all public 
procurement. The Authority is independent in fulfillment of its duties.     
These agencies in Turkey have the authority to regulate, supervise, express their opinions, 
implement sanctions, solve conflicts in markets they are active. In Turkey, IRAs’ powers 
include enforcing sector rules, licensing, determining standards and tariffs, applying fines 
and investigating. IRAs have authority to request all information from the regulated and 
to examine all their books, documents and records. Mentioned agencies act independently 
while they use this authority. These agencies do not get orders or instructions from any 
person, institution or authority while they undertake their duties and benefit from broad 
administrative and financial autonomy. 
In Turkey, status of IRAs generally can be summarized as followings: 
- Board members and head are appointed by the Council of Ministers among 
candidates having qualifications which are stated via related Laws. Candidates 
are presented from different public institutions and professional associations. 
- Long term of office (4-6 years) is ensured for members and head of board. Except 
PPA, the principle of ‘no appointment renewable’ has not been implemented, 
- Members of Board can not be removed from office before their terms of office 
end and can be dismissed only for official misbehaviour. The dismissal of board 
members from office before they finish their fixed term has been tied very strict 
conditions. 
- IRAs’ board members are exempt from civil servant salary rules. The board 
members and staff are paid higher salaries compared civil servants in other 
institutions. 
- The IRAs have financial and organizational autonomy. Budgets of these agencies 
are composed of sources specific to them. These include fees levied on the 
regulated industries, shares received from the fines, aids like donations. They are 
free in determining of their internal organization in according to their needs. 
- The IRAs subject to judicial review.     
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3.1. The place of IRAs in Turkish Administrative Structure 
 
Although IRAs have been given political, organizational and financial autonomy by 
related Laws, since Turkey does not have long tradition of IRAs like other continental 
countries such as France and Italy do, place of these agencies in Turkish administrative 
structure is controversial. In Turkey, there are different opinions among administrative 
jurists and academicians about the place of IRAs in administrative structure. While some 
jurists find talking about IRAs in Turkey as a fantasy considering main basics and 
principles dominating Turkish administrative structure, some try to place these agencies 
somewhere in current structure (Duran 1997: 3; Erkut 1998: 131; Gunday 2001: 76; 
Ulusoy 2003: 93; Ozdag 2002: 19; Ardıyok 2002: 83-84; Tan 2000: 126). 
First of all, it is necessary to state that Turkey is a unitary state. The integrity between the 
units in a unitary state structure is fulfilled by two means named hierarchy and 
administrative tutelage. Hierarchy refers to ranking in the administrative structure and 
means that the officers in the structure are bound to each other step by step and degree by 
degree from highest rank to lowest rank where all obeys orders from superiors. Hierarchy 
ensures integrity not just among the institutions of central administration but also among 
various organizations and units in the same legal personality (Gunday 1999: 53-54). 
Administrative tutelage is a legal mean which ensures the integrity between central 
administration and institutions of decentralization which arise as a result of 
implementation of decentralization system. In other words, administrative tutelage is 
authority of supervision over decentralization institutions of central administration in 
order to secure the integrity of state and harmonious working of public services in the 
country.  
IRAs are not under supervision of hierarchy and administrative tutelage mentioned above. 
This feature of IRAs is the most important one that distinguishes these institutions from 
other administrative institutions in Turkey and it causes them to be likened to an ‘island’ 
in administrative organization. Consequently, this feature gives rise to problems in 
countries like Turkey which have unitary state structure in determining the place of such 
institutions in administrative organization. 
According to Article No.123 of 1982 Constitution, “administration forms a whole with 
regard to its structure and functions and shall be regulated by law. The organization and 
functions of administration are based on the principles of centralization and 
decentralization. Public legal personality is established either by law or authority given 
clearly by law.” As it is seen from Article No.123, only centralization and 
decentralization are possible in Turkey. 1982 Constitution does not allow any other 
organization type. As a result, IRAs can not be a third category besides centralization and 
decentralization. These institutions can be placed somewhere in two administrative 
structures in current system. 
It is not possible to include IRAs in centralization considering the features they have. This 
results from the fact that hierarchic control is implemented in centralization. In 1982 
Constitution, local administrations which emerged as a result of implementation of 
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decentralization principle in terms of location are defined and stated by their names. 
Consequently, it is not possible to think these agencies among local administrations. 
Additionally, the features these agencies have do not allow such placing. Because, local 
administrations are subject to central administration’s administrative tutelage control in 
Turkey. 
There are also functionally decentralized organizations which emerged as a result of 
implementation of decentralization principle in terms of functions but these organizations 
do not have a direct place in 1982 Constitution. These were established on basis of phrase 
in Article 123 stating that public legal personality can be established by law or authority 
given clearly by law. 
There are definite differences between IRAs and functionally decentralized organizations. 
First of all, while functionally decentralized organizations undertake a specific service, 
IRAs do not. These agencies are institutions which regulate and control sectors that are 
sensitive for society.  Additionally, organs of functionally decentralized organizations can 
be assigned and removed from office by executive power. As a result, it is not possible to 
talk about the independence of functionally decentralized organizations. Additionally, 
while IRAs are out of control of administrative tutelage, operations of functionally 
decentralized organizations are subject to central administration’s administrative tutelage 
control. Consequently, it is not possible to place IRAs among functionally decentralized 
organizations. 
Since IRAs can not be placed among central and local administrations because of features 
like their public legal personality, organic and functional independence and autonomy 
and since they can not be included into functionally decentralized organizations; they can 
be seen as a fourth category or model besides local administrations, functionally 
decentralized organizations and professional associations which have public institution 
characteristics.   
At this point it should be noted that actually the features and functions of IRAs are not 
compatible with the structure of decentralization. Because of this, if such features will be 
maintained; first thing to do is to change the Article 123 of Constitution and to accept 
IRAs as a third administrative structure besides structures of centralization and 
decentralization. 
It should also be noted that in order to include these agencies into administrative integrity, 
each of them was related to a Ministry. According to this, TTPABMRA and CMB were 
related to Minister of State charged by Prime Minister, EMRA to the Ministry of Energy 
and Natural Resources, SA and CA to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, TA to the 
Ministry of Transport, PPA to the Ministry of Finance, RTSC to the Prime Ministry and 
BRSA to the Prime Ministry or to the Minister of State charged by the Prime Minister. 
The aim of this method was to establish the connection between these agencies and the 
administrative structure. However, the only power these ministries have is to take the 
operations and actions of IRAs they find against law to administrative courts. 
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3.2. The Control of IRAs in Turkey 
 
One of the most debated topics regarding the IRAs in Turkey is about the control over 
them. One can talk about three types of control over IRAs in Turkey: jurisdictional, 
administrative and financial control. First of all, it should be stated that a general 
jurisdictional control of administrative actions was regulated by Article 125 of 1982 
Constitution and it was accepted that in principle, one can apply to jurisdiction against 
any decisions and operations of the administration. 
Smith (1997b: 19) states that the place which is applied against the decisions of IRAs 
should be independent as well. It can be said that high jurisdiction in Turkey does not see 
IRAs differently from other administrative institution. As a result, there is not a difference 
between jurisdictional control of these institutions’ decisions and other administrative 
institutions’ decisions (Ulusoy 2003). 
It is clear that the jurisdictional control of IRAs will be done in administrative 
jurisdiction. However, there is not a single way to follow regarding the place where 
necessary application for this control will be done at first hand, that is, the first degree 
court. For example, while the Council of State is the first degree court for the lawsuits 
against the decisions of the CA, BRSA and EMRA; Ankara administrative courts are 
authorized for lawsuits against the RTSC. 
However, the bill about the supervisory and regulatory agencies which was sent by 59th 
Government to the parliament and intends to determine common methods and 
fundamental principles regarding IRAs’ formation, organization, authority and duties, 
control and status of board members and employees aims to put an end to different 
practices in this issue and accepts the Council of State as first degree court. 
In the context of IRAs’ administrative control, there seems to be a distinction between the 
decisions these institutions take and operations undertaken regarding the sector regulated 
and decisions they take about internal affairs and their own management (Ulusoy 2003: 
69). It is stated that if IRAs’ decisions regarding the sector regulated are controlled by an 
administrative unit attached to politicians, this will be against the basic philosophy and 
purpose considered during the establishment of these agencies and such control may be 
used as a mean for political pressure. As a result, it is stated that the decisions taken by an 
IRA about related sector should not be subject to administrative control but 
administrative control should be in place for decisions and operations regarding internal 
affairs and management. 
In Turkey, financial control of IRAs is an intensely debated topic and it is focus of current 
interest. The latest development about the financial control of these agencies is Act No. 
5018 of Public Financial Management and Control. Before this act passed, there was 
uncertainty in financial control. However, with Act No.5018, in a similar way to practices 
in developed countries, the Turkish Court of Accounts was authorized for the financial 
control of IRAs. 
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3.3. Formal Independence Levels of IRAs in Turkey: Empirical Analysis 
 
Data and Methods 
In order to evaluate the formal independence of IRAs in Turkey, index of IRAs’ 
independence developed by Gilardi (2002: 881-883) is utilized. This index is focused on 
formal independence of IRAs. This can be divided into five main dimensions, namely the 
agency head status, the management board members’ status, the general frame of the 
relationships with the government and the parliament, financial and organizational 
autonomy and the extent of delegated regulatory competences. The indicators are 
presented in detail in Table 1. 
Each indicator is numerically coded on a scale of 0 (lowest level of independence) to 1 
(highest level of independence). Under every indicator, there are choices showing 
possible situations regarding this indicator.   
                         
Table 1: Formal independence of regulatory agencies 
Dimension Indicators Numerial 
Coding 
A) Agency head status 1) Term of Office  
         - over 8 years 1,00 
         - 6 to 8 years 0,80 
         - 5 years 0,60 
         - 4 years 0,40 
 - fixed term under 4 years or at the discretion of 
the appointer 0,20 
         - no fixed term 0,00 
 2) Who appoints the agency head?  
         - the management board members 1,00 
         - a complex mix of the executive      
        and the legislature  0,75 
         - the legislature 0,50 
         - the executive collectively 0,25 
         - one or two ministers 0,00 
 3) Dismissal  
         - dismissal is imposible  1,00 
 -only for reasons not related to policy   0,67 
         - no specific provisions for dismissal 0,33 
         - at the appointer’s discretion 0,00 
 4) May the agency head hold other offices in 
government?  
         - no 1,00 
         - only with permission of the  
        Executive 0,50 
         - no specific provisions 0,00 
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Table 1 Contunied  Table 1 Contunied  Table 1 
Contunied  
         - no 1,00 
         - yes, once 0,50 
         - yes, more than once 0,00 
 6) Is independence a formal requirement fort he 
appointment?  
         - yes 1,00 
         - no 0,00 
B) Management board 
member’s status 
  
 7) Term of Office  
         - over 8 years 1,00 
         - 6 to 8 years 0,80 
         - 5 years 0,60 
         - 4 years 0,40 
 - fixed term under 4 years or at the 
discretion of the appointer  0,20 
         - no fixed term 0,00 
 8) Who appoints the management board 
members?  
         - the agency head 1,00 
         - a complex mix of the executive  
        and the legislature 0,75 
         - the legislature 0,50 
         - the executive collectively 0,25 
         - one or two ministers 0,00 
 9) Dismissal  
         - dismissal is imposible 1,00 
         - only for reasons not related to  
        Policy 0,67 
         - no specific provisions for dismissal 0,33 
         - at the appointer’s discretion 0,00 
 10) May management board members 
hold other offices in government?  
         - no 1,00 
         - only with permission of the  
        Executive 0,50 
         - no specific provisions 0,00 
 11) Is the appointment renewable?  
         - no 1,00 
         - yes, once 0,50 
         - yes, more than once 0,00 
 12) Is independence a formal requirement 
for the appointment?   
         - yes 1,00 
         - no      0,00 
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Table 1 Contunied Table 1 Contunied Table 1 Contunied 
         - yes 1,00 
         - no 0,00 
 14) Which are the formal obligations of 
the agency vis-a-vis the government?  
         - none 1,00 
 - presentation of an annual report 
for information only 0,67 
 - presentation of an annual report 
that must be approved 0,33 
         - the agency is fully accountable 0,00 
 15) Which are the formal obligations of 
the agency vis-a-vis the parliament?  
         - none 1,00 
 - presentation of an annual report 
for information only 0,67 
 - presentation of an annual report 
that must be approved 0,33 
         - the agency is fully accountable 0,00 
 
 
16) Who, other than a court, can overturn 
the agency’s decision where it has 
exclusive competency? 
 
         - none 1,00 
         - a specialized body 0,67 
         - the government, with           
        Qualifications 0,33 
         - the government, unconditionally 0,00 
   
D) Financial and 
Organizational Autonomy 
17) Which is the source of the agency’s 
budget?  
         - external funding 1,00 
         - government and external funding 0,50 
         - governmet 0,00 
 18) How is the budget controlled)  
         - by the agency 1,00 
         - by the accounting Office or court 0,67 
         - by both the government and the  
        Agency 0,33 
         - by the government  0,00 
 19) Who decides on the agency’s internal 
organization?  
         - the agency 1,00 
         - both the agency and the   
        Government 0,50 
         - the government 0,00 
 20) Who is in charge of the agency’s 
personnel policy?   
         - the agency 1,00 
         - both the agency and government 0,50 
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         - the government 0,00 
   
E) Regulatory Competencies 21) Who is competent for regulation in 
the sector?  
         - the agency only 1,00 
         - the agency and another  
         independent authority            0,75 
         - the agency and parliament 0,50 
         - the agency and government 0,25 
         - the agency has only consultative          0,00 
   
   
Source: Modified from Gilardi (2002). 
 
In this study, multidimensional scaling analysis is used to determine the formal 
independence of IRAs in Turkey. Firstly, multidimensional analysis is introduced by 
Richardson (1938), and after with Torgerson (1952, 1958), Shepard (1962), and Kruskal 
(1964) this analysis method has been popular. The goal of multidimensional scaling is to 
find a representation of the objects in a low-dimensional space. Thus, complex 
relationship among the objects in multidimensional data matrix can be presented and 
interpreted easily by multidimensional scaling. In addition, multidimensional scaling can 
be used to introduce similarity and dissimilarity (Takeuchi et al. 1983: 410). 
 
Applying multidimensional scaling analysis is important to identify data’s measurement. 
Because, technical of distance matrix is chosen according to measurement type of data. 
(Jobson 1992: 585). Multidimensional scaling analysis is utilized from distance matrix. 
Consequently, we must calculate distance matrix suitable to data’s type. If measurement 
of data is interval or ratio, it is the most used Euclidean distance that can be calculated for 
i and j unit as follows:  
 
2/1r
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jkikij )XX(d úû
ù
êë
é -= å
=
       
 (1) 
Where id2i1i X,...,X,X  is element of vector iX , and jd2j1j X,...,X,X  is  element of 
vector jX  for r,...,2,1k = .  
 
After applying multidimensional scaling, we must compare configuration distance with 
distance obtain from original data for suitability. That is to say, Stress measure is used for 
compare suitability to finding results with original distance matrix. Stress measure can be 
calculating as follows (Hair et al. 1998: 540). 
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Where d  is mean distance ( n/d ijå ), ijd  is original distance, and ijdˆ  configuration 
distance for between i and j. So, the more ijdˆ  is close ijd , the more stress value is small. 
The stress measure is used to compare suitability between original distance and distance 
obtained from solution. Therefore, lower stress measure indicates better solutions (Timm 
2002: 546). 
Results 
As a result of the multi-dimensional scaling analysis, it is seen that among alternative 
dimensions, three-dimension case is the most suitable one. Iteration implemented for 
three-dimension solution and result of Young’s Stress test, which gives goodness of fit, 
are shown in Table 2.  
Tablo 2: Young’s Stress Test Result 
İteration S-stress Improvement 
1 0,08968 - 
2 0,06588 0,02380 
3 0,06284 0,00303 
4 0,06269 0,00016 
 
S-stress test stops when recovery is below 0,001. The stress test value (0.06269) found in 
third iteration shows that goodness of fit is at high level.  
The values given according to indicators used in the evaluation of IRAs’ independence 
show also similarities and dissimilarities between related agencies. The coefficient of 
Stimulus coordinates is used for the evaluation of such similarities and dissimilarities. In 
the context of this study, similarities and dissimilarities point out independence levels of 
IRAs. The agency which has the highest positive Stimulus coefficient is the most 
independent regulatory agency in Turkey. 
When Table 3 is analyzed, it is seen that the highest positive value (1.2193) in the first 
dimension belongs to the BRSA. After a complete examination of indicators measuring 
the independence of institutions, it is found that BRSA is the one which has the highest 
level of independence among IRAs. On the contrary, SA is the one which has the lowest 
level of independence in the first dimension. This results from the fact that, SA takes a 
negative and low value (-3,6921) in the examination of calculated similarities. To sum up, 
while BRSA is the most independent IRA in the first dimension, SA is the least 
independent one. The independent levels of other agencies do not show significant 
differences.  
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Table 3: Stimulus Coordinates (Similarity as to Dimension) 
No  
StimulusName 
Dimesions 
 
      1                  2                 3  
1 Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency 
(BRSA) 
1,2193 -1,5876 0,3444 
2 Capital Markets Board (CMB) 0,8124 0,0870 0,1443 
3 Telecommunication Authority (TA) 0,1564 -0,1164 -0,6434 
4 Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA) 0,4053 -0,4418 1,2125 
5 Competition Authority (CA) 0,5554 -0,2245 -0,0488 
6 Sugar Authority (SA) -3,6921 0,2993 0,2121 
7 Public Procurement Authority (PPA) 0,4909 0,6703 -1,0105 
8 Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTSC) 0,7207 -1,7506 -0,0989 
9 Tobacco, Tobacco Products and Alcoholic 
Beverages Market Regulation Authority 
(TTPABMRA) 
-0,6683 -0.1108 -0,1116 
 
Table 4 is a matrix showing the distances among agencies. For example, first column 
demonstrates the distances between the BRSA and itself and the BRSA and other 
agencies. 
 
Table 4: Optimally Scaled Data Disparities 
 Optimal Disparities Among Independent Regulatory Agencies 
 BRSA CMB TA EMRA CA SA PPA RTSC TTPABMRA 
BRSA 0,000         
CMB 1,677 0,000        
TA 2,444 0,830 0,000       
EMRA 2,544 1,567 1,712 0,000      
CA 2,017 0,000 0,277 1,171 0,000     
SA 5,025 4,469 3,992 4,344 4,275 0,000    
PPA 1,817 1,659 0,626 2,356 1,275 4,392 0,000   
RTSC 3,183 1,935 2,065 2,175 1,586 4,803 2,655 0,000  
TTPABMRA 2,662 1,722 0,719 1,484 1,347 3,153 1,578 2,305 0,000 
 
If the first column is analyzed, it is seen that the BRSA is the most distant agency to the 
SA (5,025). Actually, this is another way to confirm that the BRSA has the highest level 
of independence since the SA has the lowest level of independence. An interesting point 
is the closeness between the distance values of the CMB and CA. The fact that calculated 
distance value is equal to 0,000 shows that independence levels of these two agencies are 
very close to each other. Another interesting point is that the SA is the most distant 
agency to any agency. 
 
The matrix of optimal distances between IRAs can be also modeled as a graph. Although 
it is found that appropriate model for this study must be three dimensioned, the distances 
are drawn for two-dimension case since it is not easy to understand and to comment on 
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three-dimension case. In Fig. 1, it is seen that the BRSA is the regulatory agency with the 
highest independence level in Turkey as it is the closest one to the ideal point. On the 
contrary, the SA has the lowest level of independence since it is the most distant one to 
the ideal point.     
 
Figure 1: Derived Stimulus Configuration for Independent Regulatory 
Agencies                                                    
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4.  Conclusion 
 
Many theories and reasons are put forward in the literature to explain the creating of the 
IRAs which are established in order to improve the market efficiency and to purify the 
market from the effects of politicians. However, in case of Turkey, it is possible to say 
that these agencies were established as a result of conjectural developments like the 
process of EU candidacy or suggestions from international organizations rather than such 
theories and principles. 
 
The IRAs are out of classical supervision of political power and administrative 
institutions. Additionally, employees of these agencies have more security in terms of 
appointment procedures, terms of office and dismissal from the office relative to 
employees in other institutions. All these elements can be seen as necessary conditions to 
put the independence of the IRAs under guaranty. In this context, it can be stated that the 
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IRAs in Turkey generally have the independence that the IRAs in developed countries 
have at least in legal grounds. 
However, all these features make these institutions a focus of intense debate in Turkey as 
it is the case in other continental European countries like Italy and France. As a result of 
these features, it gets difficult to find a place for these agencies in administrative structure 
of Turkey which is a unitary state. This results from the fact that these agencies are in 
conflict with the principles and means which dominate current administrative structure. 
The solution to this problem is to change Article No.123 of 1982 Constitution and to 
undertake necessary regulations which will achieve the legitimacy of the place these 
agencies have in Turkish administrative structure. 
In addition, according to results of empirical analysis, BRSA has the highest level of 
independence among IRAs. On the contrary, SA is the one which has the lowest level of 
independence. The independent levels of other agencies do not show significant 
differences. Consequently, necessary measures should be taken to improve formal 
independence level of SA.   
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